Features of Land Conflicts in Post Civil War Rwanda by 武内 進一
Features of Land Conflicts in Post Civil War
Rwanda
権利 -
journal or
publication title
African study monographs. Supplementary issue
number 42
page range 119-138
year 2011-03
出版者 The Center for African Area Studies, Kyoto
University
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1158
119African Study Monographs, Suppl.42: 119-138, March 2011
FEATURES OF LAND CONFLICTS IN POST CIVIL WAR RWANDA
Shinichi TAKEUCHI
JICA Research Institute
Jean MARARA
Institut de Recherche Scientifi que et Technologique
ABSTRACT  Land confl icts in Rwanda have attracted particular attention because they have
both environmental and political causes. This paper attempts to shed light on the nature of land 
confl icts in present-day Rwanda based on popular justice records and interviews collected in
two rural areas. From the analyses of these data, two types of land confl ict can be distin-
guished. The fi rst type consists of those among family members. Given that land is the most 
important asset for ordinary rural households, its inheritance often brings about confl icts
 between right-holders. Those of the second type are triggered by political change. Impacts of 
the two national-level violent confl icts in Rwanda, the “social revolution” just before indepen-
dence and the civil war in the 1990s, are of tremendous signifi cance in this context. The mili-
tary  victory of the former rebels in 1994 caused a massive return of Tutsi refugees, who were
offi cially permitted to acquire land from the original inhabitants. Although no serious protesta-
tion against this policy has occurred thus far, it has produced various land confl icts. Dealing
with potential grievances among original inhabitants is an important challenge for the present 
government.
Key Words: Land; Confl ict; Rwanda; Family; Politics.
INTRODUCTION
Much discussion has taken place with regard to the importance of land in
African rural societies. The majority of the African population in rural areas is
made up of farmers who depend on the land as their means of production. It is
impossible for them to ensure food security without land. In addition to having
economic value, land has signifi cant political and symbolic value for many societies.
Its importance has often led to confl ict (Anseeuw & Alden, 2010). Due to
complexity in the value of land, the causes of land confl icts tend, therefore, to
be similarly complex; such causes may be economic, political, historical, symbolic,
or a combination of these. Analyses of land confl icts can therefore shed light on
the core problems of rural societies, thus contributing to establishing an effective
land policy.
Rwanda is a tiny and densely populated country, where the great majority of 
the population lives in the countryside and is engaged in agriculture (Guichaoua,
1989; Bart, 1993). Land has been the central issue of the political economy in
Rwanda for centuries; since at least the 17th century, Rwanda’s traditional kingdom
has been based on intensifi ed agriculture, and political leaders have continuously
intervened in the distribution of land (Vansina, 2001). This state of intervention,
and repeated violent confl icts, has politicized Rwandan land tenure. In other words,
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Rwanda has seen the emergence of a particular state-society relationship, in which
macro-level political changes strongly affect micro-level land distribution
(Adriaenssens, 1962; André & Lavigne Delville, 1998; Takeuchi & Marara, 2009).
In line with this trend, the present government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), the former rebel group who took power in 1994, has actively
intervened in land tenure, as shown in its policies for returned refugees, agriculture
and the land itself (Bruce, 2009; Huggins, 2009; 2010; Ansoms, 2008; 2009;
Pottier, 2006).
In this context, frequent outbreaks of land confl ict in Rwandan rural society
have attracted attention and are considered to be an alarming sign because the
political turmoil caused by the civil war and the RPF’s victory, in addition to the
presence of land scarcity, has brought about considerable tension and confusion
with regard to land tenure. Land has been the most common cause of confl ict in
contemporary rural Rwanda. It is well known that during the genocide in 1994,
political leaders instigated the killings in rural areas by saying, “If you participated 
in the killing, you will be remunerated by the land.” Emphasizing the seriousness
of land confl ict in Rwanda, Musahara and Huggins (2005) presented a pessimistic
viewpoint, as expressed by one member of the society, who stated that, “Due to
the pressures of land scarcity and the frequency of land disputes, the government 
is ‘sitting on a volcano’” (p. 329).
This paper attempts to clarify features of land confl icts in present Rwanda.
Although previous literature has made important contributions in elucidating the
intentions of the Rwandan government with regard to rural society and the land,
mainly through policy analyses, current situations as well as reactions on the ground 
have not been suffi ciently discussed. Whether the aforementioned pessimistic view
is relevant will be proven only by an analysis of land confl icts themselves. This
paper examines the causes and context of land confl icts through legal documents
and supplementary interviews, and discusses the characteristics and political
implications of land confl icts. This examination will not only elucidate the nature
of the commonest confl ict in rural Rwanda but will also contribute to estimating
under what conditions an eruption of the “volcano” is likely to occur.
CONDITIONS INFLUENCING LAND TENURE
Rwandan land tenure has been mainly conditioned by three factors: the natural
environment, population, and politics. The country is situated over the highlands
in the eastern area of the West Rift Valley. The famous expression—“A country
of a thousand hills”—fi ts the central region particularly well, where countless
hills extend as far as the eye can see. The Rwandan climate is conditioned by
the topography: the further west, the lower the altitude, which entails warmer 
temperatures and lower levels of precipitation. The majority of the country is
suitable for agriculture. High agricultural productivity has enabled a dense
population to survive and the development of a traditional kingdom (Schoenbrun,
1993; 1998).
Today, Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, with
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394 persons per km2 in 2008 (World Development Indicators). The overwhelming
majority of the population live in rural areas and are engaged in agriculture.
According to a recent census, the agricultural population(1) reached up to 84% of 
the total population (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). As a result of intensive agricultural
activity, given this high population density, arable land counted for 48.6% of the
total land area in 2007; this fi gure was the highest among 48  Sub-Saharan African
countries(2) (World Development Indicators).
In societies of the Great Lakes Region, dense populations and intensifi ed land 
use are common features. These features promoted the development of agriculture,
which led, in turn, to the creation of centralized political communities in
 pre-colonial periods (d’Hertefelt, 1962). Rwanda was the most centralized and the
most militarily developed kingdom among them in the latter half of the 19th
century. The state began to intervene in the allocation of lands as early as the
1840s, when the reserved pastoral estate granted by the king (igikingi, pl. ibikingi)
appeared. Roughly speaking, it was a landlord system in which a small number 
of powerful pastoralists exploited other pastoralists and peasants (Nkurikiyimfura,
1994; Vansina, 2001). The pastoralists could be considered Tutsi, and peasants
Hutu(3). While the powerful pastoralists, who had been connected with the king
and been provided with ibikingi, could afford the possession of enough areas for 
grazing, other small pastoralists and peasants suffered instability with regard to
land rights, due to the land scarcity. They were obliged to pay tribute, as well
as labor services in the case of Hutu peasants, to Tutsi chiefs, who had authority
over land distribution (Reisdorff, 1952; Adriaenssens, 1962; Vansina, 2001).
At the end of the colonial period, Rwanda saw a revolutionary political change
called the “social revolution” (Lemarchand, 1970; Reyntjens, 1985), which had 
an enormous impact on land tenure. This fi rst-ever large-scale ethnic confl ict 
resulted in the victory of the Hutu party, PARMEHUTU (Parti du mouvement de
l’émancipation hutu), to the detriment of the Tutsi-led party, UNAR (Union
Nationale Rwandaise). Consequently, the existing political system dominated by
Tutsi elites was overthrown; as many as 200,000 to 300,000 UNAR supporters
and their families, most of them Tutsi, were expelled or fl ed from the country
by the mid-1960s. They were called “old-case” refugees. After the massive outfl ow
of old-case refugees, vast lands without owners were left behind, and then
confi scated by local authorities, who were now local leaders of the PARMEHUTU
party. These local authorities, especially the Burgomasters (chiefs of Commune)(4),
wielded enough offi cial power to distribute the confi scated lands (André & Lavigne-
Delville, 1998: 161; Pottier, 2006: 515). Many lands, which had originally been
possessed by Tutsi families or reserved for ibikingi(5), were therefore arbitrarily
distributed.
The RPF’s victory in 1994 was another revolutionary change and had a
tremendous impact on Rwandan land tenure, although the impact was reversed 
in terms of ethnicity. The second generation of old-case refugees in Uganda had 
organized the RPF. Its core members were, therefore, Tutsis. Consequently, the
RPF victory in 1994 triggered the massive return of old-case refugees to Rwanda(6).
Due to guidance from the public authority, they tended to stay in the eastern part 
of the country, where lands were relatively abundant, and acquired their land 
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properties by dividing those of the original Hutu owners(7) (Musahara & Huggins,
2005; Huggins, 2009; 2010; Takeuchi & Marara, 2005; 2009). The policy was
called “land sharing,” although it was, in reality, a complete division of land 
property. Some individuals, despite the public guidance, returned to their homeland,
where their family had lived before becoming refugees. Those who went back to
their homeland were also offi cially confi rmed to have a right to claim the land 
that had been part of their family lands(8). As we will see in the following sections,
this recent political change has caused many land confl icts.
In addition to the land allocation policy for old-case returnees, the RPF-led 
government implemented a series of policies related to the land itself, aiming for 
its effective and effi cient use. Especially important, among other policies, was the
stipulation of two laws that were deeply concerned with land: the inheritance law
in 1999 (Law No. 22/1999) and the land law in 2005 (Law No. 18/2005)(9)
(Pottier, 2006; Musahara & Huggins, 2005). The two laws ensured equal rights
of land inheritance for women, who did not have this right in the context of 
customary law. The stipulation of these laws provided women with a legal basis
for claiming their land rights, thus causing an increase in land confl icts, as we
will see later.
METHODOLOGY
Authors have conducted fi eld research in two contrasting cells(10) in the Southern
and Eastern Provinces of Rwanda since 1999 (Takeuchi & Marara, 2000; 2005;
2007; 2009). Cell B is situated at an altitude of approximately 1,700 to 1,800 m,
near Butare Town in the Southern Province. With relatively cool weather and 
abundant rainfall, the area is generally suitable for agriculture. Not far from
Nyanza, the last capital of the traditional kingdom of Rwanda, this area was
situated in the political center during the precolonial era. For these reasons, the
population density in this area has been very high, thus promoting the fragmentation
of land tenure.
Cell R is included in a sector adjoining the Akagera National Park. Although
the area was originally regarded as a part of the national park, internal migrants
from central Rwanda began to settle in the 1970s in pursuit of land. After the
civil war in the 1990s and the victory of the RPF, a huge number of old-case
returnees installed in the area. The government later reorganized local administrative
units to exclude Cell R from the park. Because of its relatively low altitude
(approximately 1,300 m), the Eastern Province has generally high temperatures
and little rainfall, thus lessening the population density compared with other parts
of the country(11). Traditionally, raising cattle has been the main activity of the
inhabitants.
We attempted to identify the characteristics of land confl icts in the two cells
by combining investigations into judicial records with interviews. As for judicial
records on land confl icts, we consulted records of the local mediation committee,
the abunzi, which was established in each cell. This local system of confl ict 
mediation was introduced to Rwanda in 2007(12). Members of the abunzi, working
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as mediators, are selected among local inhabitants and work voluntarily without 
salary for confl ict resolution in the cell.
The abunzi’s authority is not very strong. Although it can deal with civil cases
as well as criminal cases, its activities are limited to mediation. The abunzi is
expected to undertake mediation before confl icts are brought to local courts. If 
the concerned parties are not satisfi ed with their recommendation, they can bring
the case to the local court. The abunzi, thus, contributes to reducing the burden
on local courts. It was, in fact, the main reason behind the introduction of the
abunzi. This does not mean, however, that the authority of the abunzi is negligible.
Investigations, discussions, and decisions of the abunzi are submitted as offi cial
documents if the case is brought to a local court. The abunzi virtually functions
as a fi rst-instance trial of justice.
We systematically investigated the abunzi fi les in the two cells. For Cell B,
we checked 127 cases from January 2007 (when the abunzi system launched) to
November 2008. For Cell R, 39 cases between July 2008 and January 2009 were
collected(13). In both cells, we found that confl icts concerning land are overwhelm-
ingly predominant among the abunzi cases(14), while types and causes are various.
In other words, land is the most common cause of confl ict in rural Rwanda(15).
Although the frequency of land confl icts in rural Rwanda is clear, judicial
records are often insuffi cient for understanding the reasons and backgrounds of 
confl icts. Supplementary explanations by concerned parties are needed. For this
reason, we conducted a series of interviews during our research trip in February
2010 with presidents of the abunzi in the two researched cells in order to clarify
the background of each land confl ict case. Due to the addition of new cases that 
had occurred after our previous visit, 50 cases of land confl ict in Cell B and 61
cases in Cell R were examined in detail during the interviews(16). The lists of 
these cases are shown in the Annexes. The following analyses of land confl icts
are based on these data.
FEATURES OF LAND CONFLICTS
Land confl icts in Rwanda have two main causes. One is concerned with  family
and inheritance. The other is related to political changes in contemporary history.
The two factors are often closely connected and mutually reinforcing in the pro-
duction of confl icts.
Table 1 shows a rough classifi cation of land confl icts according to their causes.
The column “familial” includes the number of land confl icts that occurred among
Table 1. Causes of Land Confl icts
Familial Political Others Total
Cell B 32(64%) 8(16%) 10(20%) 50(100%)
CEll R 20(33%) 22(36%) 19(31%) 61(100%)
Total 52(47%) 30(27%) 29(26%) 111(100%)
Source: Authors’ data.
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family members. The column “political” contains those that occurred for political
reasons, such as the return of old-case refugees, long refugee absences, and/or 
arrest based on the suspicion of genocidal crime, and payment for gacaca (17). If 
a case was caused by both factors (as in Case 12), we classifi ed it into the
“ political” column. The table shows the two characteristics of Rwandan land 
confl ict. First, family disputes outnumber other reasons in total. Land confl icts
were the most likely to occur among family members. Second, the characteristics
of land confl ict varied from one region to another. In Cell R, where many  old-case
returnees came in and acquired land, political factors have become the main
causes of land confl icts. In this section, the causes and backgrounds of land 
confl icts are examined based on case analyses.
I. Family and Inheritance
Inheritance is an offi cial occasion to confi rm an individual’s right to land, which
constitutes the most important asset for ordinary rural households in Rwanda. It 
is, therefore, quite natural that disputes relating to this asset tend to occur within
families at the time of inheritance. The fundamental rules for inheritance are not 
complicated in Rwandan customary law. Rwanda is a patrilineal society, in which
sons have equal rights to acquire inherited land from their father. The inherited 
land, called “umunani” (pl. iminani), is regarded as familial property, which  cannot 
be disposed of by means of personal reasons in a customary context.
Disputes can occur, even if the rule is clear, when land is scarce and  everyone
wants to inherit larger parcels. Women’s land rights have often been a source
of confl ict. Although daughters did not have a right for umunani in the  customary
law, they could inherit their land property, depending on the circumstances(18).
In addition, women’s land rights were recently strengthened because of the
inheritance law and the new land law. We found a number of land confl ict cases
brought to the abunzi by women(19), who consequently endorsed their claims for 
their own lands.
Moreover, problems tend to be complicated by intricate family relations, caused,
in particular by diverse and complex forms of conjugality such as polygamy,
unoffi cial marriage, and changes of spouses due to divorce or death. Although
the defi nition of right-holders to the land is indispensable in order to settle  disputes
among families, it is not often easy. Let us examine some cases brought to the
abunzi.
Case 1 (Cell R, 8/18/2008, No. 3)
NP’s husband had cleared the forest to open up a large fi eld before he
died at a young age. At the time of his death, NP had a baby and had again
become pregnant. After the death of her husband, she was in confl ict with
NT, her father-in-law, who fi nally chased her away from home. She returned 
to her home village. However, when she became aware that NT had sold the
fi eld that her husband had cleared, she went to see the  burgomaster to appeal
her rights for the fi eld. The burgomaster endorsed her rights and even arrested 
NT, ordering him to pay back the money obtained from  selling the land and 
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to return the fi eld to NP. Nevertheless, NT did not obey the order.
After the war and genocide in 1994, many fl ed to neighboring countries
as refugees. When NT returned to the cell, he was arrested on suspicion of 
having participated in a genocidal attack. The situation, however, did not 
change, as his family refused to return the fi eld to NP. She consulted a chief 
of the cell and sector, and then brought the problem to the abunzi, when it 
was established. Because it was a large fi eld, exceeding 2 ha, the abunzi
recommended a compromise. They fi nally agreed to divide the fi eld equally.
Case 2 (Cell B, 5/15/2009, No. 202)
NB was a common-law wife of NC. She asked for NC to give her a
fi eld for  cultivating food crops. NC’s fi rst wife had passed away earlier. She
had only one child, a daughter, who had married and lived in Bujumbura.
NC had two common-law wives. NB had three children, and the other had 
one. The abunzi  concluded that NC had to provide inherited lands (iminani)
for the four children of his common-law wives. The umunani for the fi rst 
wife’s  daughter was not taken into consideration in this case because the
abunzi determined that NC would be able to give umunani to her  separately,
as he had  relatively large family lands.
Case 3 (Cell B, 6/20/2008, No. 107)
MG demanded that her uncle, MS, redefi ne the borders of the inherited lands.
Their parents had died many years previously. The ingaringari (20) of their  parents
was divided in 1985 among MS, MB, and AN. MG did not receive any par-
cel at that time because she was considered too young and ill. Though MG
had suffered from mental illness for many years, she had recently  recovered 
and asked for her due portion of family lands. The abunzi recommended divid-
ing the ingaringari among the four family members (Fig. 1).
The fi rst three cases are disputes concerning women’s rights to land. Case 1
shows that a widow’s land right was normatively recognized even before the
introduction of the inheritance law. In Case 2, the rights of common-law wives’
children were protected. Considering the concerns expressed in previous literature
regarding the danger of children of common-law wives not being ensured their 
Fig. 1. The Genealogy on Case 3.
Source: The authors’ interview.
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inheritance rights (Pottier, 2006: 519), the abunzi seems to have provided a well-
balanced recommendation based on their local knowledge. In Case 3, the abunzi
took the appeal from a woman into consideration and recommended redefi ning
the distribution of family lands. The president of the abunzi explained that MG’s
demand had been inspired by the new laws recognizing women’s inheritance rights.
Case 4 (Cell B, 10/29/2008, Nos. 120 and 122)
EV was in confl ict with his late father’s fi rst wife (NT), who had refused 
to divide lands with him. NT and her three sons insisted that EV did not 
have a right of umunani because he was not a member of their family. As
his father (MG) had several wives, it was not easy to determine who
 precisely had the right for family lands. Although there were other family
members who endorsed EV’s affi liation with the family, NT and her three
sons intransigently refused his right. The abunzi recommended NT and her 
sons recognize EV’s right on the basis of other family members’ opinions
as well as the fact that EV’s features resembled those of NT’s three broth-
ers. However, they did not accept the recommendation, and brought the
problem to the local court. The court endorsed the abunzi’s decision.
Case 4 shows the complexity of family relations. Determining  family  membership
is diffi cult because it is deeply related to resource allocation. Interests tend to be
in strong opposition among the concerned parties.  Considering that it is  sometimes
diffi cult to solve problems among family members, mediation with the local
institution can play a positive role in the  resolution of such disputes.
Land confl icts tend to break out when different types of rights clash in  relation
to the land. The logic surrounding communal/familial possessions and that of 
individual property are often opposed, thus producing confl icts. In Rwanda, lands
are generally managed at the level of a nuclear family because of land scarcity
and fragmentation. Transaction of lands through the market, such as purchasing
and borrowing, is commonly observed (Takeuchi & Marara, 2007; Republic of 
Rwanda, 2010: 37). However, the ideology of the familial possession remains
infl uential. Even today, it is widely recommended to announce to family  members
in advance the  selling of family lands.
Case 5 (Cell B, 8/16/2008, No. 112)
TT grew up in the home of his grandfather (NZ) because his mother had 
died before the offi cial marriage when he was a child. NZ gave TT a fi eld 
as umunani. Considering the present villagization policy, he decided to sell
his land in order to move nearer to paved roads. He thus sold a banana
fi eld to a rich neighbor, NJ, around 2005. Hearing this news, HF was so
discontented with the sale that he hindered NJ from working in the banana
fi eld. NJ complained to TT about the acts of HF. Therefore, TT decided to
bring the issue to the abunzi, which endorsed TT’s legal right to sell the
fi eld (Fig. 2).
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While the abunzi recognized TT’s disposal right, the president of the abunzi
was somewhat critical towards TT in the interview, and told us that the selling
of umunani should be announced to family members in advance. According to
his opinion, although the new land law is based on the  principle of individual
property, the ideology of family possession remains strong. He said that the abunzi
should, therefore, be aware of the reality on the ground(21).
II. Infl uences of Political Change
The second important factor associated with Rwandan land confl icts is that of 
recent political change. As explained in the previous section, Rwanda has a long
history of state intervention in relation to the land. In this context, the two
revolutionary political changes (the “social revolution” and the victory of the
RPF) had tremendous impact on land tenure. The victory of the RPF in 1994
and the subsequent massive return of old-case refugees brought about a number 
of land confl icts.
Two different patterns can be found among land confl icts triggered by the return
of old-case refugees. The fi rst pattern is observable in Cell R, where land-sharing
between old-case returnees and original inhabitants was actively implemented and 
caused many disputes of a political nature (Table 1). We should, however, be
aware that the confl icts dealt with by the abunzi were rather exceptional cases.
Because land-sharing is a governmental policy for the benefi t of old-case return-
ees, it is beyond argument. Although dividing land property was undoubtedly not 
an easy decision for peasants, they had no choice but to accept the policy and 
give half of their land property. They relied on the abunzi only when they felt 
additional injustice.
Case 6 (Cell R, 12/23/2008, No. 29)
GS was an old-case returnee who was not yet married and appeared to
be younger than 30 years of age. While his parents benefi ted from land-
sharing in another cell, GS came to Cell R alone and occupied GV’s fi elds.
GV refused to divide his land for GS and brought the issue to the abunzi.
He insisted that GS could not claim land because his parents had already
acquired it. The abunzi concluded that GS should be provided with land 
because he was old enough to have his own fi eld.
Fig. 2. The Genealogy on Case 5.
Source: The authors’ interview.
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Case 7 (Cell R, 12/1/2009, No. 133)
After the civil war, KF divided his lands with an old-case returnee. Later,
the returnee sold the land he had acquired from KF to another man, HG.
Following the offi cial guideline, HG paid 6% of the purchase price to the
authority. When KF was informed of this transaction, he brought the case
to the abunzi, claiming that the land should be given back to him because
parcels acquired through land-sharing were forbidden to be sold. The abunzi,
however, endorsed the validity of the transaction on the basis of HG’s
 payment to the authority. They judged that the transaction was legal.
In Case 6, the problem was whether a young, unmarried, old-case returnee
could implement land-sharing while his parents had already benefi tted from it. In
such a case, the land-sharing has been generally admitted, as the authors reported 
a similar case in Cell R (Takeuchi & Marara, 2005). Case 7 shows that the trans-
action of lands, which were originally transferred by land-sharing, had been
increasingly liberalized. At the outset, the sales of divided parcels were, in  principle,
prohibited. Later, it was allowed under the condition that buyers paid 6% of the
purchase price to the authority. The obligation of a 6% payment was subsequently
abolished. When the authors carried out this research in Februaly 2010, the authority
recommended, instead, that the selling of land should be announced beforehand 
to the original owner, though it is not an obligation.
Case 8 (Cell R, 8/18/2009, No. 125)
MK, an old-case returnee, occupied the lands of KR after the war.  During
the occupation, MK demolished KR’s house to construct a new one. In the
meantime, KR remained in prison for many years. When KR got a tempo-
rary release in 2005, he claimed his right to half of the land because MK 
had occupied the entirety of his property. Subsequently, KR returned to
prison as a result of a gacaca trial. When he fi nally got out of prison in
March 2009, he requested that the abunzi take back his land because MK 
continued to occupy the entirety of his property. The abunzi recommended 
dividing the land equally, and that MK should pay 200,000 Rwandan Francs
(Frw) in compensation for demolishing the house.
While old-case returnees are generally privileged in the sense that their land 
rights tend to be prioritized over those of the original inhabitants, Case 8  indicates
that their unlawful acts were punished. The abunzi often rejected excessive demands
from old-case returnees.
The second pattern of land confl ict caused by the return of old-case  refugees
can be found in Cell B, where disputes occurred between inhabitants and  old-case
returnees who had lived there before the “social revolution.” Although old-case
returnees were offi cially recommended to stay in the eastern part of the country, in
which land was relatively abundant, some of them came back to where their family
lands had existed.
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Case 9 (Cell B, 11/7/2008, No. 124)
NK was an old-case returnee who came back from Burundi. NK claimed 
MT’s land, which MT had been given by the burgomaster in 1965. The
abunzi endorsed NK’s claim. According to the abunzi investigation, the land 
belonged to the subchief (22) RD in the colonial period. MH, one of RD’s
umugaragu (23) and the father of NK, inherited it after RD’s death, although
MH was later obliged to fl ee to Burundi in 1961 due to the “social revo-
lution.” After independence was achieved, MH’s land property was confi s-
cated by the local administration and distributed to MT in 1965. The abunzi
recommended that the entirety of MT’s fi elds in Cell B should be  transferred 
to NK and her family because MT had land properties in other places.
Case 10 (Cell B, 8/14/2007, No. 66)
MR was an old-case returnee of approximately 80 years of age. He
accused KI of illegally occupying his family land. KI insisted that the land 
belonged to NR’s family and that she had inherited the right from NR and 
his son FW. KI came to Cell B in 1973 to marry FW, who was killed 
during the genocide in 1994. They were a Tutsi family. The abunzi inves-
tigation revealed that the land belonged to RD, MR’s father.
RD was a subchief in this area in the colonial period, and died in a
traffi c accident in the 1950s. NR was RD’s umugaragu. MR fl ed to Burundi
in 1961, due to the “social revolution,” but NR and his family chose to
stay in Cell B.
After the RPF victory in 1994, MR returned from Burundi and lived in
Kigali. He began to claim his land rights in Cell B in 2006. While he was
not completely satisfi ed with the decision of the abunzi, because he believed 
that RD’s land property had been much larger than the area that the abunzi
had allowed to him, he was to some degree appeased because his land 
rights were offi cially acknowledged (Fig. 3).
The above two cases are related to the lands of the former subchief RD.
Although the family controlled large areas in the colonial period, many of them
fl ed abroad due to the “social revolution.” The land left behind was often con-
fi scated by the local administration and distributed to Hutu peasants, as Case 9
shows. In Case 10, an umugaragu of the subchief occupied the land after the
departure of his patron. In this case, the old-case returnee (Tutsi) accused the
survivor (Tutsi) of occupying the land illegally.
The “social revolution” was not the only political event causing subsequent 
land confl icts. After independence was achieved, the persecution of the Tutsi often
Fig. 3. The Genealogy on Case 10.
Source: The authors’ interview.
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occurred under the dominance of the Hutu elite, as the next example demon-
strates.
Case 11 (Cell B, 2/6/2009, No. 207)
TJ accused NP of illegally occupying his land. TJ’s family (Tutsi) previ-
ously had extensive land properties. In 1973, however, the conseiller (a
sector chief) confi scated, by force, a part of their land to give to NP’s
husband, who was the conseiller’s follower and favorite. TJ had no choice
but to accept the requisition amid the anti-Tutsi atmosphere under the
Hutu-led regime. He recently decided to bring the case to the abunzi, who
judged that the land had been taken up forcibly and therefore should be
given back to TJ.
Among recent political changes, the gacaca trial has had enormous impacts on
rural society in general and on land confl icts in particular. In gacaca,  perpetrators
of category 3 crimes, i.e., those who had committed crimes against property, were
ordered to make reparation payments, thus causing many cases of land selling to
make money. This has often triggered land confl icts among family members.
Case 12 (Butare, 7/24/2009, No. 203)
MA, born in 1991, accused her grandmother NB (born in 1948) of  having
sold her lands without consulting her. NB sold the land to make money for 
the reparation of damages done during the genocide because SY, NB’s  husband 
as well as MA’s grandfather, had been ordered at the gacaca to pay 761,000
Frw for reparation. The abunzi recommended that NB give back to MA and 
her brothers the same size of fi elds that she had sold (Fig. 4).
The president of the abunzi explained that they knew SY had extensive lands,
so that NB would be able to fi nd the land for MA. For her part, MA was also
obliged to pay 270,000 Frw for reparation, due to the crime of her father NJ.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined some examples of land confl ict in today’s Rwanda by
investigating cases involving the abunzi, through which two principal patterns
have emerged. One is that of confl ict within families. Inheritance tends to  trigger 
Fig. 4. The Genealogy on Case 12.
Source: The authors’ interview.
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confl icts because land is the most important asset for ordinary peasants. In  addition
to the general scarcity of land, the introduction of new laws guaranteeing  women’s
rights seems to have increased the number of land confl icts among families. The
new norm in terms of women’s land rights has been penetrating Rwandan rural
society.
The other is that of confl ict due to political factors. The Rwandan political
regime recently experienced a revolutionary change, because of the military  victory
of the RPF, causing a massive return of old-case refugees. Due to the RPF-led 
government policies supporting their acquisition of land, many peasants were
obliged to divide their fi elds. Although we have collected a number of land  confl ict 
cases concerning old-case returnees, these may only be the tip of the iceberg. As
land-sharing for old-case returnees is offi cially recommended under the present 
regime, people generally tend not to voice their discontent because to do so would 
not only be in vain but politically dangerous.
Comparing the characteristics of the two confl ict types, it is clear that they
have different implications and risks. On one hand, land confl icts in families are
basically apolitical. Their frequent outbreaks may indicate the rampant poverty
and social tension in Rwandan rural society, but it is unlikely that they would 
result in political protestation. They are, rather, related to the long-term challenges
of Rwandan rural development. On the other hand, land confl icts regarding old-
case returnees are politically more dangerous. The antagonism between old-case
returnees and original inhabitants can be ethnicized because the former are Tutsi
and the latter, generally, Hutu. The on-the-ground reality is, obviously, not so
simple. As Case 10 clearly shows, the opposing parties in land confl icts do not 
necessarily coincide with the ethnic affi liation. It is, however, imaginable that 
grievances with regard to land-sharing may be utilized for the instigation of  ethnic
extremism.
Instead of a volcanic eruption, violent confl icts can be prevented if their causes
are well understood and countermeasures are taken. To this end, initiatives for 
poverty reduction as well as measures attenuating the negative impact of  returnees
with regard to land problems should be promoted.
NOTES
(1) The agricultural population refers to the number of people belonging to agricultural
households, which are defi ned as “Households where at least one member was engaged 
in any of the following: agricultural activities, livestock, fi sheries, forestry or bee-
keeping” (Rwanda, 2010: 9).
(2) World Development Indicators follow the defi nition of arable land by the FAO, as land 
under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows
for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily
fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded.
(3) We do not have enough space to explain the process of ethnic formation (Tutsi, Hutu,
Twa) in Rwandan history. See Vansina (2001) and Newbury (1988) for detail.
(4) The Commune was a local administrative unit that was introduced at the time of 
independence. Originally, it corresponded to a sub-chiefdom in the colonial period.
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The Commune provided a much stronger and more substantial authority, such as land 
distribution and tax collection, than did other local administrative units. The unit was
abolished at the administrative reform in 2001, and was reorganized into the unit of 
“District.”
(5) The Ibikingi was legally abolished in 1960. See Reyntjens (1985: 209).
(6) Estimation of the number of returnees is diffi cult. It has been estimated at 600,000
( Huggins, 2009: 69), 700,000 (Bruce, 2009: 112), and 900,000 (Offi ce of United Nations
Resident Coordinator for Rwanda, 2000: 2).
(7) The original owners are often called “new-case” refugees because they took refuge after 
the 1994 genocide in neighboring countries.
(8) The guidance of the local authority was as follows: (1) if the actual owner does not live
on the site claimed by an old-case returnee, and if he/she possesses land elsewhere, the
entirety of the claimed land should be given to the returnee; (2) if the actual owner lives
on the site of the claimed land, and if he possesses land elsewhere, the claimed land 
should be given to the returnee, except the house and its surroundings; and (3) if the
actual owner lives on the site of the claimed land, and if he has no land elsewhere, the
land should be equally divided between both parties. This guidance is well known
throughout the country (interview conducted with a sector chief in former Cell B area on
August 16, 2002).
(9) The new land law was generally characterized by the concepts promoting effi cient land 
use. Owners are obliged to use lands “in a productive way” (Art. 62), and are to be
 penalized if they fail “to respect the obligation of effi ciently conserving the land and 
productively exploiting it” (Art. 73). In addition, in order to prevent the fragmentation of 
land, the law promotes “the consolidation of land,” defi ned as “a procedure of putting
together small plots of land in order to manage the land and use it in an effi cient uniform
manner so that the land may give more productivity” (Art. 2), and stipulates that “it is
prohibited to reduce the parcel of land reserved for agriculture of one or less than a
hectare” (Art. 20). Although these clauses can cause confl icts if they are rigidly applied,
the authority has not, thus far, taken measures toward the strict application of these
clauses.
(10) “Cell” refers to the smallest Rwandan administrative unit, which contains at least one
salaried offi cial. Several cells compose a sector, which is organized with other sectors
into a district. A province, being composed of several districts, is the largest local unit.
(11) According to the 2002 national census data, the population density per km2 of Butare
prefecture (where Cell B was located) was 386, while that of Umutara prefecture (where
Cell R was located) was 100 (République rwandaise, Service national de recensement,
2003: 17).
(12) Based on the Organic Law No. 31/2006, the abunzi system was launched at the begin-
ning of 2007.
(13) Collection of these data was carried out during our visit in November 2009. In Cell R,
the fi rst abunzi committee, established in January 2007, had ceased their activity before
July 2008 due to allegations of corruption. We could not consult documents under their 
management because they had already disposed of them.
(14) For details, see especially Figs. 3 & 4 in Takeuchi & Marara (2009).
(15) This agrees with the argument of Musahara & Huggins (2005).
(16) Although the period of data collection was shorter in Cell R than in Cell B, the former’s
number of land confl icts was greater than the latter’s. There are two possible reasons for 
this. One involves the number of old-case returnees. Considerable numbers of old-case
returnees were installed in Cell R after 1994 and carried out land-sharing, thus causing
many disputes. The other is the infl uence of the land registration policy. The government 
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implemented pilot projects of land registration in the Eastern Province. In 2009, they
were carried out in Cell R’s neighboring areas. The offi cials explained to people that a
plot would be registered only when it had no confl ict with regard to ownership. People
therefore rushed to the abunzi in order to resolve ambiguous cases before the registration
(interview with the president of the abunzi in Cell R; February 10, 2010).
(17) The gacaca refers to a popular justice introduced to Rwanda for the purpose of judging
genocide criminals (Waldorf, 2006; Ingelaere, 2009).
(18) For instance, the umunani is likely to be provided to a daughter if she has no brother or 
if she has come back from her husband’s family due to divorce or bereavement. More-
over, parcels granted to women under the name of the inkuracyobo and the uwiteto are
considered to be their individual properties. Inkuracyobo refers to assets (such as land 
and cattle) given to a child who took care of their old parents. Usually, the youngest son
or daughter tends to be granted it. If parents give a valuable present, such as land or 
cattle to their daughters, it is called uwiteto. Contrary to the umunani, the recipients of 
the inkuracyobo and the uwiteto can dispose of them as they wish.
(19) For instance, 26 of 50 cases of land confl ict registered in Cell B were brought to the
abunzi by female accusers.
(20) The ingaringari refers to the remnants of family lands left after the provision of iminani
for children. It is used for the subsistence of aged parents, and will be left after their 
death for the youngest child (a son or an unmarried daughter) who takes care of them.
(21) In fact, we found a case in which the abunzi considered a land sale without a prior 
announcement to be invalid (Cell R, No. 129).
(22) “Subchief ” refers to a chief of a subchiefdom, the lowest local administrative unit in the
colonial period. The subchief had considerable power in Rwanda before the “social
revolution.” See Reyntjens (1985) and Note 4 of this paper.
(23) Before the “social revolution,” Rwandan society included a patron-client relationship
called “ubuhake,” which was characterized by the exchange of a cow from the patron
and an allegiance from the client. The umugaragu refers to a client in this relationship.
He might be either a Hutu or a Tutsi.
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Appendix 1. Land Confl icts Registered to the Abunzi in Cell B
No.
First 
received 
date
Sex of the
accuser
Sex of the 
accused Problems
9 1/26/2007 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
10 1/31/2007 f m Underleasing a fi eld of banana without consent.
11 2/2/2007 m m Moving border marks without permission.
14 2/16/2007 f f Demand for the family land.
34 5/5/2007 m f Selling a part of family land without announce in advance.
35 5/5/2007 m f Cutting trees without permission.
38 5/25/2007 m m Border dispute.
40 6/1/2007 m f Border dispute.
45 6/13/2007 m f Dispute on land leasing.
50 6/22/2007 m f Trouble on the management of family lands.
52 6/26/2007 f m Trouble on the management of family lands.
54 7/3/2007 m m,m,m Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
55 7/18/2007 f f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
58 8/3/2007 f f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
65 6/18/2008 f f Selling a part of family lands without announce in advance.
66 8/14/2007 m f Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
67 9/5/2007 f f Selling a part of family lands without announce in advance.
92 12/14/2007 f f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
93 12/14/2007 m m Border dispute.
94 2/8/2008 m m Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
95 2/15/2008 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
97 3/7/2008 m m Dispute on land leasing.
98 3/7/2008 m m Dispute on selling of family lands.
99 3/21/2008 m m Dispute on selling of family lands.
103 5/23/2008 f m Dispute on selling of family lands.
104 6/13/2008 m m Border dispute beween brothers.
107 6/20/2008 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
111 8/2/2008 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
112 8/16/2008 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
116 9/12/2008 m f,m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
117 9/12/2008 f m Border dispute beween family members.
120 10/29/2008 m f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
122 10/24/2008 m m,m,m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
124 11/7/2008 f f Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
125 11/14/2008 f m Dispute on purchase of family lands.
129 6/19/2008 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
133 n.d. m f Dispute on land selling.
201 8/17/2009 f m Demand of land division from a wife.
202 5/15/2009 f m Demand of land by two common-law wives and their children.
203 7/24/2009 f f Dispute on selling of family lands for Gacaca payment.
206 3/6/2009 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
207 2/6/2009 m f Demand for return of a land, taken by the order of localadministrator in 1973.
208 8/8/2008 f m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
209 8/21/2009 f f,m,f,m,f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
210 9/4/2009 f m,m Dispute on selling of lands.
211 10/9/2009 f m Border dispute beween family members.
212 11/27/2009 f f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
213 1/30/2009 m m,m Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
214 11/30/2009 f m Demand of land by two common-law wives and their children.
215 3/6/2009 m f Demand of an old-case returnee for his family lands.
Source: Data collected by authors.
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Appendix 2. Land Confl icts Registered to the Abunzi in Cell R
No.
First 
received 
date
Sex of the
accuser
Sex of the 
accused Problems
3 8/1/2008 f m Demand of a widow for her late husband’s fi eld.
5 10/4/2008 m m Dispute on the selling of divided land.
6 10/9/2008 f m Dispute on border between fi elds.
7 10/21/2008 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
12 8/11/2008 m m Border dispute.
14 10/7/2008 m m Dispute on land distribution between brothers.
15 10/13/2008 f m Dispute on family lands.
16 10/1/2008 m f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
22 8/18/2008 m m Selling a fi eld that had been entrusted by a neighbor.
23 8/25/2008 m m Demand to return an occupied fi eld.
24 12/13/2008 m m Border dispute between brothers.
25 12/16/2008 m m Border dispute between brothers.
28 12/9/2008 m m Dispute on allocation of family lands for an orphan.
29 12/23/2008 m m Land division with an unmarried old-case returnee.
30 1/6/2009 m f Border dispute between an old-case returnee and an originalland owner.
36 10/13/2008 f m Border dispute on land selling.
37 12/23/2008 m m Border dispute between neighbors.
101 7/27/2009 m m Dispute on land division. A family member of the originalowner demanded to divide once again.
102 12/22/2009 m m Demand for the return of land occupied by old-case returnees.
103 8/14/2009 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
104 11/24/2009 m m Border dispute between neighbors.
105 10/20/2009 f m Land division by a Tutsi who is not an old-case returnee.
106 11/3/2009 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
107 8/1/2009 m m Demand to return a parcel requisitioned for imidugudu policy.
108 8/18/2009 m m Selling land for the Gacaca payment.
109 7/28/2009 f m Demand for family land.
110 9/8/2009 church m Border dispute.
111 2/24/2009 m f Land division by a Tutsi who is not an old-case returnee.
112 1/23/2009 m m Dispute on land occupation by a neighbor.
113 9/29/2009 m m Dispute on land occupation by a neighbor.
114 9/29/2009 m m Occupation of afforested area by an old-case returnee.
115 9/22/2009 f f Demand of family land by a widow.
116 9/1/2009 m m Dispute on land distribution between family members of old-case returnee.
117 9/1/2009 f m Confi rmation of border marks.
118 7/28/2009 m,f m,m Confi scation of land for the Gacaca payment.
119 6/2/2009 f m Dispute on belonging of land.
120 6/16/2009 f cooperative Border dispute.
121 6/20/2009 f church Dispute on belonging of land.
122 6/30/2009 m m Dispute on land selling.
123 5/19/2009 m f Dispute on distribution of family lands.
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124 6/30/2009 f m Dispute on belonging of land between an original inhabitant and an old-case returnee.
125 8/18/2009 m m Dispute on belonging of land and house between an originalinhabitant and an old-case returnee.
127 6/9/2009 m m Dispute on distribution of family lands.
128 3/24/2009 m m Dispute on belonging of land between neighbors.
129 1/20/2009 f f Demand of inherited land by a daughter.
130 4/28/2009 f f Dispute on land selling.
131 10/20/2009 f m Dispute on belonging of land between Tutsi survivors.
132 11/10/2009 m m Dispute on belonging of land.
133 12/1/2009 m m Dispute on selling of divided land with an old-case returnee.
134 12/22/2009 m m Dispute on land leasing.
135 9/29/2009 f m Border dispute between neighbors.
136 8/4/2009 f m Attempted fraud on land selling.
137 7/21/2009 m m,m Dispute on belonging of land between an original inhabitant and an old-case returnee.
138 2/24/2009 f m Border dispute.
139 10/9/2009 m m Illegal land occupation by a survivor.
140 1/5/2010 f m Border dispute between family members.
141 1/5/2010 m m Border dispute among neighbors.
142 7/14/2009 f m Dispute on belonging of land between family members.
143 11/10/2009 m f Dispute on land selling between husband and wife.
144 12/10/2009 m m Border dispute on an afforested area.
145 12/15/2009 m m Border dispute.
Source: Data collected by authors.
